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ABSTRACT
FLORIAN STOECKEL: The Effect of Information on EU Support and Attitude Ambivalence
(Under the direction of Liesbet Hooghe.)
The ambivalence of EU citizens towards the European integration project is an attitude dimen-
sion which has largely been neglected, but promises to answer important puzzles. In this paper
I measure ambivalence in individual level support for the EU based on how respondents answer
two items on the EU. I show empirical support for that more self-assessed and more objective
knowledge on the EU decrease ambivalence in EU support. This effect persists among highly
educated people, which is taken as evidence that the dependent variable measures ambivalence
instead of how nuanced people’s attitudes are. I also show that a strong attachment to both
one’s country and the EU (”a dual identity“) decreases ambivalence. The relationships are con-
firmed when tested by using a heteroskedastic regression in which ambivalence is understood as
response variation. A final analysis reveals that standard predictors (economic rationality, iden-
tity, political cues) explain attitudes towards the EU much more for unambivalent Europeans
than for ambivalent ones.
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Introduction
Do Europeans display well-defined and unambiguous attitudes towards the European Union
(EU) or do they tend to be ambivalent towards it, that is, do they simultaneously display
positive and negative attitudes towards the EU? This paper analyzes how individual attitudes
towards the EU are affected by increasing knowledge on the European Union and its institutions.
More precisely it examines whether increasing knowledge decreases or intensifies ambivalence,
or whether it leads to more nuanced attitudes. The role of ambivalence receives increasing
attention in the American public opinion literature but has rarely been discussed in the context
of European public opinion research. This paper thus seeks to discuss and apply the insights of
American public opinion literature to the context of European integration.
Numerous studies on American public opinion find that many people are ambivalent when
it comes to political issues (Zaller and Feldman 1992; Alvarez and Brehm 1995, 1997). With
increasing attention being paid to attitude structure, more sophisticated tools have been devel-
oped to measure ambivalence (for an overview see Miller and Peterson 2004). This in turn has
contributed to more rigorous analyses of ambivalence and its consequences for political outcomes.
Studies in political science and social psychology find that increasing ambivalence leads to less
attitude stability, a lower predictability of vote choices, as well as a greater susceptibility to
temporarily salient information and contextual cues (Basinger and Lavine 2005; Huckfeldt and
Sprague 2000). Thus, understanding ambivalence of attitudes towards European integration is
crucial in understanding Euroskepticism, the success of anti-EU parties and the dynamics of EU
related referendums.
The theoretical part of the paper introduces the literature on ambivalence and discusses
different operationalizations of ambivalence. The concept of ambivalence has not received much
attention by scholars of European public opinion. Unsurprisingly then, measures for ambivalence
are not included in large-N surveys such as the Eurobarometer or European Election Study.
Given the absence of a direct measure, I develop a new measure of ambivalence based on variation
among answers towards different survey items gauging EU support.
The empirical part of the paper has three sections. I find that increasing knowledge and a dual
identity, that is an identification with both, one’s nation and the EU, decrease ambivalence in EU
support. The first section presents a heteroskedastic regression model. In this modeling tradition
ambivalence is understood as response variation. In the next section I discuss the weaknesses
of this approach and construct a more direct measure to capture response variation, which is
based on two EU related question items. I refute the criticism that this measure of ambivalence
only assesses how nuanced someone’s view on European integration is, rather than measuring
ambivalence. With increasing knowledge highly educated people should be expected to form
more nuanced attitudes towards the EU. According to my results, however, knowledge decreases
response variation and this effect is particularly strong for highly educated people. This finding
contradicts the view that such a measure of ambivalence just captures more nuanced attitudes.
The last section tests how well standard models predicting EU support perform for unambivalent
and ambivalent respondents. The results suggest that ambivalent Europeans make up their minds
on the EU in a different way than their non-ambivalent peers. Apparently, the most widely cited
explanations for levels of EU support pertain primarily to unambivalent Europeans.
EU Support and Ambivalence
Public sentiments toward the EU have been analyzed for more than three decades. Past
research has looked at developments of EU support over time (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993,
2007), and a rich tradition of cross-sectional analyses helps us understand which factors shape
individual level support for European integration. Economic rationality (Gabel and Palmer
1995; Gabel 1998), identity (Hooghe and Marks 2004, 2005), and cues (Steenbergen et al. 2007;
Steenbergen and Jones 2002) turn out to be powerful predictors for EU support. The depen-
dent variables in these studies vary between the crude three-category variable “support for EU
membership of one’s country”, the more nuanced desired speed of European unification (Brine-
gar et al. 2004), preferences for an EU government (Rohrschneider 2002) or authority transfer
to Brussels (McLaren 2007). Alternatively, other authors use a combination of these items to
construct a more fine graned scale (De Vries and Van Kersbergen 2007; Hooghe and Marks
2005). This body of research claims to talk to one another because the goal in each study is to
operationalize the underlying latent concept “support for European integration” (Brinegar and
Jolly 2004). The unifying assumption is that someone’s attitude towards European integration
is indeed best captured by one dimension ranging from low support to high support.
A citizen’s level of support is however just one property of an individual’s attitude structure
towards a political object. Other important properties of attitudes include their accessibility,
importance or relevance to the individual, or extremity (Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Krosnick et al.
1993). For the political context, attitude certainty and ambivalence are particularly consequential
attitude properties and have received wide attention in social psychology and American public
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opinion research. In their widely cited work on the mechanism of public opinion formation,
Zaller and Feldman conclude “most people possess opposing considerations on most issues, that
is, considerations that might lead them to decide the issue either way” (1992, p.585). But
by measuring support for European integration only on one dimension, one fails to pick up
the extent to which respondents actually possess opposing considerations. Answering in favor
of EU membership of one’s country can stem from much certainty in this attitude. But a
respondent could just as well be torn between considerations speaking very much for and against
EU membership. Surveys usually force respondents into providing a specific level of support.
A respondent might answer pro EU membership because considerations for the EU slightly win
over those against it. This person could end up in exactly the same EU support category as
someone who has much certainty in her attitude. Survey data analyses usually treat the two as
if their attitude towards the EU was similar.
American public opinion research literature tells us that this difference in the attitude struc-
ture is not at all trivial. In their analysis of the relationship between inconsistency and stability
in abortion attitudes, Huckfeldt and Sprague (2000) find that those who carry opposing consid-
erations have more difficulty in retrieving their attitude. Also, ambivalence is connected to less
certainty in one’s attitude and with less self-assessed attitude stability over time – i.e. people
who are ambivalent on an issue think themselves that they might change their attitude rather
quickly. Unsurprisingly then, ambivalence makes political attitudes less predictable (Alvarez
and Brehm 1995, 1997, 2002; Rudolph 2005). Basinger and Lavine (2005) explain low pre-
dictability of voting behavior with ambivalence in party identification. They also demonstrate
that ambivalence changes which cues people use for making their vote choice. Economic voting
replaces party identification for ambivalent respondents. Generally, the empirical evidence sup-
ports that ambivalence makes political choice processes more difficult for individuals. Among
ambivalent people, policy preferences and attitudes are much more dependent on what infor-
mation is salient at a specific point in time. Lavine et al. (1998) find experimental evidence
for the greater importance of temporarily salient information for ambivalent people. Since ones
immediate environment or context is always most salient, they can also show ambivalent peo-
ple’s greater susceptibility to context effects. Ambivalent individuals seem more likely to draw
random samples of considerations from their memory when retrieving an attitude. Since nega-
tive information is often more salient than positive information, McGraw et al. (2003) find that
candidate evaluations of ambivalent respondents tend to be more negative.
Against the background of strong evidence for the importance of ambivalence, most Ameri-
can surveys include at least some items with which it can be measured. 1 Surveys on attitudes
1 The popular National Election Study (NES) asks participants to mention good and bad things that come
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towards European integration, such as the Eurobarometer or European Election Study, lack
such direct items with which ambivalence can be measured. Consequently, studies on the ex-
tent to which Europeans are ambivalent about European integration, as well as on the sources
and consequences of their potential ambivalence, are lacking. To date, only Steenbergen and de
Vries (2011)2 have researched a study on this issue. In the absence of items tapping ambiva-
lence directly, their measure is rather indirect. They use an inferential approach that models
response variation in support for European unification as ambivalence. The authors employ a
heteroskedastic regression model that follows Harvey (1976), as well as Alvarez and Brehm (1995,
1997, 2002). Steenbergen and De Vries (2011) find evidence for ambivalence among Europeans
in regard to European unification. According to their results, knowledge is not related to am-
bivalence in EU support, while EU media salience slightly increases ambivalence. Interestingly,
a dual identity – i.e. identification both with one’s country and the EU – decreases ambivalence.
They also find that obscurity of party positions on the EU increases ambivalence; and they have
evidence for a curvilinear effect for the timing of EU membership and perceived party differences
on ambivalence.
Ambivalence has mainly been defined in two ways: as a conflict of values , and as the coexis-
tence of positive and negative views on an issue (for an overview see Miller and Peterson 2004).
According to the conceptualization as value conflict, ambivalence is the result of conflicting core
beliefs. Alvarez and Brehm (1995) give the example of people who experience ambivalence in
their attitude towards abortion policies because they hold both strong beliefs about women’s
rights and respect for human life. Thus, when forced to reconcile these positions, people need
longer to answer (“response time latency”) or express more response variation. Other research
in political science (Zaller 1992; Zaller and Feldman 1992; Lavine 2001; Thompson et al. 1995;
Holbrook and Krosnick 2005) uses the broader understanding of ambivalence as coexistence or
endorsement of positive and negative evaluations on one issue or object. This follows the domi-
nant conceptualization in social psychology (e.g. Kaplan 1972; Cacioppo et al. 1997; Fazio 1995).
While conceptualizing ambivalence as value conflict can be seen as a reasonable approach and
definition, Steenbergen and Brewer (2004) note that ambivalence rooted in a conflict of core
beliefs is just one manifestation of it and consider different, broader notions. Indeed, many
of the findings on the consequences of ambivalence are based on the broader understanding of
to their mind when thinking about the two major parties. Those who mention both positive and negative
considerations about both parties are considered ambivalent (Basinger and Lavine 2005). Some surveys measure
response time latencies (Huckfeldt and Sprague 2000). Other set ups include to let people first rate positive
aspects of an object and then negative ones, assuming that simultaneously held strong positive and negative
evaluations identify ambivalence, while strong positive and weak negative ones (or vice versa) characterize the
absence of ambivalence (Lavine 2001). And some studies include items that directly ask respondents about the
extent to which they have mixed feelings on an issue Tourangeau et al. (1989).
2 I am very grateful to the authors for providing me with a draft of their paper.
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simultaneously held good and bad evaluations of one object (e.g. Basinger and Lavine 2005;
Lavine et al. 1998). The understanding of ambivalence in this paper follows this second, broader
conceptualization rooted in social psychology.
In the absence of a literature on ambivalence in regard to EU support, it is helpful to look
more closely at how the process of opinion formation and the role of ambivalence is conceptu-
alized in the American context to formulate hypotheses. In Zaller’s “Receive-Accept-Sample”
(RAS) model (1992), American voters are differentiated between politically sophisticated atten-
tive people, politically unsophisticated and inattentive people, and a majority of people who fall
in between those poles. All people are constantly bombarded with a large volume of mostly
opposing considerations on many political issues which can potentially enter their memory. Za-
ller notes that people with low political sophistication are unlikely to carry numerous opposing
considerations on political issues due to their inattention to politics. Politically very sophis-
ticated people follow politics, but they have the cognitive means to reject considerations (e.g.
from a party or person they do not support) right away, so that they are also not carrying many
opposing considerations – or at least have very consistent attitudes on most political issues and
are therefore low in ambivalence. However, the majority falls in between and can be expected
to be ambivalent on an issue like European integration: most people somewhat follow political
news and have some political skills. But most do not necessarily reject most (opposing) con-
siderations on an issue right away and they therefore carry around considerations with which
they can potentially support either side of an issue. When asked to give an opinion or answer
a survey question, people engage in sampling considerations from whatever is accessible on an
issue in their memory. They are more likely to oversample from very salient information, such as
current news and recent experiences (Zaller 1992; Zaller and Feldman 1992; Lavine 2001). Thus,
politically sophisticated people can sample from already coherent considerations, even though
they might be aware of counterarguments. This also means that samples are less affected by tem-
porarily salient information and that politically sophisticated people’s attitudes are more stable,
as well as more consistent. People with medium levels of sophistication and attention to politics
would have opposing considerations on the same issue in their mind and to have less stable and
consistent attitudes. Subsequently, one can expect that at least a share of Europeans is indeed
ambivalent about European integration.These people possess a variety of views allowing them
to decide the issue either way. In this model, more knowledge on the EU should lead to a more
crystallized, consistent attitude towards European integration.
Steenbergen and De Vries (2011) refine this model in their theory of response variation
and add the importance of cues. Accordingly, people do not consider each and every piece of
(potentially opposing) information on a complex issue such as European integration, but they
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resort to cues that help them find their position. In this conceptualization, people are expected
to be ambivalent about European integration in case they do not possess enough cues to come to
a clear position, or when the cues they possess are contradictory. From this perspective, knowing
more about the EU means that more cues are available and people are less ambivalent about
European integration. Steenbergen and De Vries (2011) also emphasize that people with more
knowledge on an issue are better able to integrate new and competing cues in their memory. The
capability to make sense of counter attitudinal information helps people with high levels of EU
knowledge to maintain a lower level of ambivalence. This makes the expectation of a negative
relationship between knowledge on the EU and ambivalence in EU support more reasonable.
H 1: Some Europeans feels ambivalent about European integration. And
this ambivalence is reduced by more knowledge on the EU.
There are also reasons to expect the opposite, i.e. that it is knowledge on the EU which
makes opposing considerations on the integration project available in people’s memory – the
result would be that people high in knowledge would have very nuanced views on the EU, rather
than them being ambivalent. Since this is a very crucial theoretical difference and differentiating
empirically between people with nuanced or ambivalent attitudes is challenging, addressing this
issue will be a focal point of the empirical part of the paper.
There are however other ways for people to make a quick judgment on how they stand in
regard to European integration. Identities have been found to be very important in this context.
For instance, people with an exclusive national identity – those unable or unwilling to allow for
a European identity side by side their national one – have been found to be significantly less
supportive of the EU. This suggests that someone’s identity configuration also plays a role for
ambivalence and that clear identity cues make people less ambivalent. Identifying both strongly
with one’s nation and with the EU can however mean two things. On the one hand, it can mean
the availability of opposing cues and therefore ambivalence. On the other hand it can mean
that people who identify with both communities successfully integrated a European identity into
their national identity, so that the successful coexistence of these social identities is a source for
a clear position on the EU, rather than for ambivalence.
H 2: A dual identity decreases ambivalence about the European integra-
tion project.
If Europeans are ambivalent about European integration, and it is expected that some are,
this paper wants to make a first step in the direction of exploring the consequences of an am-
bivalent attitude structure. The literature on EU support emphasizes three main predictors that
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help people determine their stance on European integration: economic rationality, identity, and
political cues (Hooghe and Marks 2005). The cue taking based theory of response variation
outlined by Steenbergen and De Vries (2011) suggested that cue availability and ambivalence
are closely connected. In their heteroskedastic regression model, the authors assume that re-
spondents, whose EU support value can be less well predicted, are ambivalent. I test this with
my hypothesis three. I argue that for people who are ambivalent about European integration,
temporarily salient information – including current events and media reports – play a much
more important role for their current EU support than such things like occupation or education
(Lavine et al. 1998). However, standard models explaining EU support use only those socioe-
conomic variables to predict EU support. Subsequently, such a standard model should perform
much better for unambivalent respondents than for those who are ambivalent about European
integration.
H 3: A standard socioeconomic variables based model to explain and pre-
dict individual level EU support can explain much more variance among
unambivalent respondents than among ambivalent respondents.
Data, Model, and Measurement
Data and Model
The data for the quantitative analyses comes from Eurobarometer survey 68.1, for which the
data collection took place in September and October 2007. The data consists of representative
samples of around 1000 respondents from all EU member states. The survey includes standard
Eurobarometer items gauging EU support, as well as detailed questions on the self-assessed and
objective knowledge of Europeans on the EU.
A popular approach in the literature to deal with ambivalence is to estimate a heteroskedastic
regression model.3 By presenting the results from this approach, one can directly compare the
modeling and results of this tradition with my suggestion. To connect to this literature, I will
estimate the heteroskedastic regression first. In a second step, I will employ my modeling and
present ordered logit models in which ambivalence is the dependent variable. This provides
evidence on the validity of hypotheses one and two. Hypothesis three is about how a standard
model of EU support performs differently for ambivalent individuals compared to unambivalent
respondents. In order to test this, I estimate models with EU support as dependent variable.
3 In this model, ambivalence is defined as response variation.
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Then I compare the results for an unambivalent and ambivalent sample. 4
Dependent Variables
Most studies of EU public opinion deal with individual level of support for European integra-
tion. Therefore, items such as someone’s support for EU membership, attitude about European
integration, or image of the EU are used or combined to tap the latent concept “support for
European integration”. This study is about people’s ambivalence in their “support for European
integration.” Since European public opinion surveys have never been concerned with ambiva-
lence, no items that directly capture the concept are available.
To deal with this problem, Steenbergen and De Vries (2011) follow an approach in American
public opinion research (Alvarez and Brehm 1995, 1997, 2002) and operationalize ambivalence
as response variation. This means that heteroskedasticity is treated as manifestation of am-
bivalence. Usually, one assumes homoskedasticity in a regression: that errors follow a normal
distribution with constant variance; each yi has a similar probability to deviate from its pre-
diction. Heteroskedasticity means that this variance is not constant for all observations and
that the error variance for some yi is much larger for some observations than others (i.e. some
predictions are much worse than others). This can also be understood as if some observations
that are very similar to one another in their characteristics differ much more in regard to their
level of EU support than others. This is the conceptualization of ambivalence when modeled as
response variation. Ambivalence is revealed by the fact that some respondents’ error variances
are significantly larger than others. This operationalization has its limitations. Being similar in
many respects but showing different levels of EU support must not necessarily indicate ambiva-
lence among the respondents. In fact, an individual might not be at all ambivalent and thus
differ (much) from others in his or her EU support value.5
Following the understanding that ambivalence is the simultaneous presence of good and bad
evaluations on one and the same object, a proper measurement of ambivalence is to ask people
both how positively they evaluate an object and how negatively they see the same object –
or how much they like and dislike something (Cacioppo et al. 1997). The crux is to measure
positivity/approval and negativity/disapproval separately. Neither the Eurobarometer, nor the
4 This set up follows the assumption that causality runs from knowledge to ambivalence to EU-support. The
notion here is that a certain level of ambivalence might or might not affect someone’s support for the EU, but
that a level of EU-support is unlikely to create attitudinal ambivalence.
5 Furthermore, this modeling of ambivalence has been criticized for the limitation that it can only report on
whether ambivalence is present in a given sample. But with this approach one cannot identify the individual
respondents who are ambivalent, nor to what extent they are ambivalent (Miller and Peterson 2004). Another
problem is that any kind of heteroskedasticity can be due to model misspecification, such as an omitted variable
problem, and would therefore be caused by the researcher. Confidence in that the measured heteroskedasticity
does in fact reveal ambivalence is warranted only to the extent that no specification error created it.
8
European Election Study, or any other large-N survey on the EU include such items.
In Eurobarometer 68.1 people are asked to rate the EU on closely related scales. Respondents
are asked if they support the EU membership of their country and what their image of the EU
is. A couple of unrelated questions follow in between of these items, so that response bias should
be limited.6 Both of these scales range from a negative value (no support, very negative
image) to a positive value (support, very positive image) and have a neutral middle category
(neither/nor, neutral image).7 The two items are no replacement for the measurement of
ambivalence by employing two dimensions, one running from neutral to a positive value, the
other one running from neutral to a negative value. But these two scales allow us to get an
idea of how consistent a respondent’s attitude towards the EU is. Consistent answers include
the combinations of no-support and negative image, neither/nor and neutral image, as well
as support and positive image. In their overview of measurement approaches to ambivalence,
Steenbergen and Brewer (2004) emphasize that the consistency of attitudes across items is one
way of conceptualizing ambivalence. Respondents are considered to be unambivalent if they
expressed a consistent attitude. Respondents who express an answer on one item that is in the
opposite direction of their answer on the second item are considered highly ambivalent. Such
a combination would be ”EU membership support“ and a ”negative image of the EU“ (or vice
versa). Ambivalence was defined as holding both good and bad evaluations on the same issue.
Such a response pattern expresses the presence of both good and bad evaluations on European
integration. These highly ambivalent respondents can be found in the dark grey cells in table 1.
Finally, there are respondents who chose the neutral category on one of the two items (light grey
cells). They are treated as in being in between of the first two groups and to express medium
levels of ambivalence. This procedure yields three groups of respondents: unambivalent ones
(coded 0), medium level ambivalent respondents (coded 0,5), and highly ambivalent respondents
(coded 1).
This way of measuring ambivalence poses at least two concerns. One limitation is that
different answers on both items could be the result of a nuanced opinion on European integration,
rather than ambivalence. The second weakness is that highly ambivalent respondents could have
selected the middle category on both items. The measure so far would treat those respondents
as unambivalent. The subsequent analysis will deal with both challenges.
6 I am very grateful to Jonathan Kropko for discussing with me on many occasions the pro’s and con’s of
different measures for ambivalence given the absence of the optimal two-dimensional scale used in psychology.
7 To be precise, EU membership support has three categories, while the image of the EU has five categories.
The five categories were merged into three: For this analysis it does not matter if someone supports the EU but
has only a ”somewhat positive image“ of it rather than a ”very positive“image. By merging the categories ”very
negative“and ”somewhat negative“, as well as ”somewhat positive“and ”very positive“one can more precisely
pick up if the valence of someone’s answer on both items changed.
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For the test of hypothesis three, as well as for the heteroskedastic regression model, the level
of EU support is the dependent variable (rather than ambivalence). EU support will be measured
as a respondent’s mean of the two items “EU membership support” and “image of the EU”. The
image item was rescaled so that both variables have equal weights in the index.8
Independent Variables
The independent variables to test the hypotheses are knowledge on the one hand and dual
identity on the other hand. Knowledge will be measured in two ways, an objective and a sub-
jective one. The measure for objective knowledge is based on seven factual knowledge questions
that respondents were asked to answer. To ease the comparison with the effect of other variables,
the variable has been rescaled to range from 0 (no correct answer) to 1 (everything answered cor-
rectly). Subjective knowledge is based on three equally weighted items: how respondents assess
their knowledge of the EP with regards to its role within the EU, with regard to the Member
of Parliament (MEPs), and how well respondents feel informed about the EP. This variable has
again be rescaled to range from 0 (no subjective knowledge on the EU) to 1 (high subjective
knowledge). Further variables in the context of cognitive mobilization are an index for opinion
leadership (frequency of discussing politics and convincing friends), as well as years of education
after the age of 14. A dual identity is measured with a dummy variable for respondents who
both feel very much attached to their country (4 on a 1 to 4 scale) and feel very much attached
to the EU (4 on a 1 to 4 scale) at the same time.
Since there is no literature on ambivalence in support for European integration, suggestions
for control variables are lacking. However, the literature on EU support is rich and suggests a
number of important predictors. These will be included to control for confounding influences.
This body of research can be summarized by the finding of three major groups of predictors:
economic calculation, identity, and political cues. Economic rationality will be controlled for
by using dummies for occupation, as well as a variables capturing peoples personal economic
prospects and subjective national economic prospects (Gabel and Palmer 1995; Gabel 1998). It
has been shown that people‘s identity and multiculturalism affect EU support (McLaren 2002,
2007; Carey 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2004). In the absence of a literal question on people’s
identities, it will be controlled for attachment to ones country, as well as whether respondents
support further enlargement of the EU. Finally, political cues have been found to drive support
for European integration (Steenbergen et al. 2007; Steenbergen and Jones 2002). The data set
does not offer which party respondents identify with. It can therefore only be controlled for
political left-right orientation.
8 For a frequency distribution of the EU support variable, see table 7 in the appendix.
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Table 1: Cross tabulation: EU membership support and image of the EU
all figures in percent EU image
negative neutral positive total
no support 7,4 3,5 1,6 12,5
EU membership neither/nor 4,8 17,6 6,5 28,9
support 1,4 13,9 43,3 58,6
total 13,6 35 51,4 100
(white cell) unambivalent respondents 68,3%
(light grey) medium level ambivalence 28,7%
(dark grey) high level ambivalence 3%
Results: Understanding Ambivalence in Support for
European Integration
Heteroskedastic Regression
In order to connect to the literature in which ambivalence is understood as heteroskedasticity
in a regression model (Steenbergen and De Vries 2011; Alvarez and Brehm 1995, 1997, 2002),
I test my hypotheses first with a heteroskeadstic regression. The procedure follows closely the
examples in the literature and uses Stata’s “reghv” command (Harvey 1976; Alvarez and Brehm
1997; Steenbergen and Brewer 2004). The level of EU support is the dependent variable and the
extent of heteroskedasticity in the model is taken as indication for ambivalence. This involves
the estimation of a mean model (common regression), which includes all major predictors known
to affect EU support (vector Xi). The model also includes an error term i. One usually assumes
these errors to be normally distributed with a constant variance (σ2i = σ
2). In a heteroskedastic
regression, one assumes that the variance is not constant (σ2i 6= σ2), but that the deviations are
driven by covariates (vector zi).
yi = x
Tβ + i
i ∼ N(0, σ2i )
σ2i = exp(z
T
i δ)
The mean model includes the following predictors for EU support: cognitive mobilization
(education, opinion leadership, knowledge), economic rationality (personal economic prospects,
national economic prospects, dummies for occupational groups), and identity (country attach-
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ment, attitude towards enlargement), as well as political orientation, age, and gender. The
covariates included in the variance part (predictors for heteroskedasticity, zi) are subjective
knowledge, objective knowledge and a dual identity. The results of the mean part of the hert-
eroskedastic regression confirm the suggestions from the literature. Cognitive mobilization and
economic rationality (a positive evaluation of one’s economic situation) increase EU support.
Similarly, attachment to one’s country, being for EU enlargement, and having a right-of-center
political orientation increases EU support.
The more interesting part are the results of the simultaneously estimated variance model.
Subjective knowledge, objective knowledge, as well as a dual identity significantly decrease re-
sponse variation. In this model, response variation (extent of heteroskedasticity) is understood
as ambivalence. The presence of heteroskedasticity means high response variation: i.e. there
are a number of respondents who are very much alike, but differ very much in regard to their
level of EU support. The negative and significant effects of subjective knowledge, objective
knowledge, as well as dual identity show that respondents with similar characteristics and high
knowledge and a dual identity have much more similar EU support levels than those with low
knowledge on the EU and no dual identity. Or put differently: people who are very similar in
their characteristics but are low in EU knowledge and have no dual identity differ much more
in their EU support levels than those with high EU knowledge and with a dual identity. These
results confirm hypotheses one and two. Steenbergen and De Vries (2011) also found that a
dual identity decreases ambivalence in EU support. However, they find that knowledge has no
effect on ambivalence, whereas I find that it does. This approach is a very indirect model of
ambivalence and only captures response variation in a sample, rather than within an individual.
Apart from that, heteroskedasticity can be a result of model misspecification and therefore be
caused by the researcher.9
9 I follow Steenbergen and De Vries (2011) in providing the log likelihood as a measure for model fit in the
results of table 2. Since this measure is only meaningful when compared across nested models, I want to add
that the given model has a VWLS R2 of 0,20 and scores 0,05 on McFadden’s pseudo R2. The VWLS R2 is more
comparable to an adjusted R2 and takes the non-constant error variance into account. McFadden’s pseudo R2
compares the deviance of a given model that includes covariates to the deviance of an intercept-only-model.
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Table 2: Heteroskedastic regression, DV: EU support (range 0-10)
Variable Coeff. SE
Mean Model
Cogn. Mobilization
opinion leadership (1-4) 0,13∗∗∗ 0,02
education (0-11) 0,10∗∗∗ 0,01
Econ. Rational
pers. econ. prospects (0-2) 0,12∗∗∗ 0,03
country econ. prosp. (0-2) 0,25∗∗∗ 0,03
self-employed 0,32∗∗∗ 0,11
manager 0,38∗∗∗ 0,10
white-collar 0,21∗ 0,08
manual 0,01 0,09
house work -0,06∗ 0,03
retired 0,26∗∗ 0,08
student 0,63∗∗∗ 0,09
Identity
attach. to nation (1-4) 0,37∗∗∗ 0,03
enlargement (0/1) 1,16∗∗∗ 0,04
Pol. Cues
polor (1-10) 0,08∗∗∗ 0,01
age 0,00 0,00
gender (1=male) 0,20∗∗∗ 0,05
Constant 1,02 0,23
Variance Model
subj know -0,52∗∗∗ 0,08
obj know -0,23∗∗∗ 0,07
dual identity -0,26∗∗∗ 0,05
N 15316
log likelihood -34517,589
∗∗∗ sign. at .001 level, ∗∗ sign. at .01 level
∗ sign. at .05 level;
country dummies not displayed;
baseline model: UK, female,
and unemployed respondents;
SE: robust standard errors
Explaining Ambivalence
In contrast to assuming that the presence of heteroskedasticity can capture ambivalence,
I want to capture response variation more directly. To this end, I construct a measure that
captures how differently a respondent answers two questions on the EU. This is the dependent
variable in the following models.10 It takes on the value of 0 when both answers are consistent
in their direction, a value of 1 if the answers are in an opposite direction, and a value of 0,5
if a respondent selected the middle category in regard to one of the two items. Because the
10 See table 1 for more information.
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dependent variable has three categories which do not necessarily need to be of equal distance,
I run ordered logit models. The models use country dummies (not displayed) as well as robust
standard errors to cope with unequal error variances.
Table 3 shows the results of four models. The first model only includes the three independent
variables subjective knowledge, objective knowledge, and dual identity. All of the three variables
have a significant and negative effect. In an ordered logit model, the coefficients refer to a linear
effect of a one unit change in x on y in standard deviation units, when all other variables are held
constant. Alternatively, the coefficients can be interpreted with respect to their effect on the
probability of being in a higher category of the dependent variable. In this case, higher values
refer to more ambivalence. The odds of moving from no-ambivalence to medium ambivalence
or from medium ambivalence to high ambivalence decrease by 46 percent (exp[-0,79]=0,46) as
subjective knowledge increases from 0 to 1 (i.e. from its minimum to its maximum). The
chances of a switch from no ambivalence to medium ambivalence or medium ambivalence to high
ambivalence decrease by 71 percent (exp[-0,34]=0,71) when objective knowledge increases from
0 to 1. Having a dual European and national identity also decreases the probability of moving
from no ambivalence to medium ambivalence or medium ambivalence to high ambivalence. A
dual identity decreases the chance for such a switch by 50 percent (exp[-0,68]=0,5).
Higher subjective knowledge, higher objective knowledge, and a dual identity make it less
likely that respondents are in the medium or high ambivalent group of respondents. Calculating
predicted probabilities allows for a more intuitive understanding of this result. Figures 1, 2, and
3 show the predicted probabilities for being in each of the categories of the dependent variable as
one of the independent variables changes from a low value to a high value. In order to compare
reasonable and empirically existing values, each independent variable was set to a value one
standard deviation (sd) below the mean and then to one sd above the mean, and everything else
is held constant. Looking at figure 1, one finds that a switch from one sd below the mean to
one sd above the mean increases the probability of a respondent to be unambivalent, while the
probabilities for being in the group of medium or high level ambivalent respondents decrease.11
Although smaller in effect size, a similar pattern is revealed by figure 2. Having both a national
and European attachment (dual identity) results yet again in the same pattern. The probability
for being unambivalent increases for respondents with a dual identity, while at the same time
the probability to be in an ambivalent group decreases.12
11 Table 8 in the appendix provides the exact figures for each change.
12 Since the log likelihood as a measure for model fit is only comparable among nested models with a similar N,
McFadden‘s pseudo R2 statistic can be more helpful for evaluating model fit of the results in table 3. Model 1:
0.02, model 2: 0.03, model 3: 0.07, model 4: 0.04
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Fig. 1: Predicted probabilities: low and high subjective knowledge
Fig. 2: Predicted probabilities: low and high objective knowledge
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Fig. 3: Predicted probabilities: presence/absence of dual identity
The results from model one confirm hypotheses one and two, as well the initial results from
the heteroskedastic regression. This model does not control for confounding effects. Model
two in table 3 is calculated by employing a number of individual level control variables. Since
there is no literature on which variables affect ambivalence in EU support, such variables are
used which are known to affect the level of EU support. I control for cognitive mobilization,
economic rationality, identity, political cues, as well as age and gender. If the effect of knowledge
and dual identity is stable even after introducing these controls, one can have more certainty
in that it is not for example education or occupation that leads to less ambivalence. Looking
at the coefficients for subjective and objective knowledge, as well as dual identity in model
two, one finds little change. All of the relevant coefficients are still negative and significant;
the sizes of the coefficients only changed by a small amount. Only a few of the various control
variables are significant, leading to the conclusion that knowledge and dual identity are the major
explanatory factors for ambivalence. Among the controls, positive national economic prospects
and being retired or a student (rather than being unemployed) lead to a smaller probability
of being ambivalent. Also seeing further EU enlargement positively and being politically more
conservative significantly decreases someone’s probability of being more ambivalent.13
The results from model two are further support for hypotheses one and two. Yet, this
13 EU support and ambivalence in EU support are negatively correlated. In order to ascertain that the results
in table 3 are not driven or affected by people’s level of EU support, the models have also been run with EU
support as additional control variable. This does not affect the conclusions. Since causality is not assumed to
run from knowledge to EU support to ambivalence, the models with EU support as additional control variable
are not displayed.
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analysis still faces the problem that my measure for ambivalence might be picking up more
nuanced attitudes rather than more ambivalence. It is therefore helpful to look at the effect of
knowledge just among highly educated respondents. Highly educated people are more likely to
have very nuanced attitudes on European integration than any other group in the sample. Model
three is calculated as an example and test on the subset of respondents with eight or more years
of education after the age of 14.14 The coefficients for subjective and objective knowledge,
as well as a dual identity are still negative and significant. Thus, even among highly educated
people more knowledge and a dual identity decrease the probability of having a higher value on
the dependent variable. If these higher values were picking up nuanced attitudes rather than
ambivalence, these results would indicate that more knowledge on the EU leads to less nuanced
attitudes – a result that is rather implausible.
14 Changing this particular cutt-off point does not affect the results.
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Table 3: Regression results, dependent variable: ambivalence in EU support (0/0,5/1)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
restricted model full model high edu. subset n/n amb. excl.
Variable Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Cogn. Mobili.
sub.know.(0-1) -0,79∗∗∗ 0,08 -0,75∗∗∗ 0,10 -0,73∗∗∗ 0,22 -0,90∗∗∗ 0,10
obj.know.(0-1) -0,34∗∗∗ 0,06 -0,29∗∗ 0,08 -0,59∗∗ 0,19 -0,26∗∗ 0,09
dual identity (0/1) -0,68∗∗∗ 0,06 -0,61∗∗∗ 0,07 -1,06∗∗∗ 0,16 -0,73∗∗∗ 0,07
opinion leader (1-4) -0,03 0,02 -0,04 0,04 -0,01 0,02
education (0-11) -0,01 0,01 0,00 0,03 -0,02 0,01
Econ. Rational
pers.econ.prosp. (0-2) -0,01 0,03 -0,09 0,06 -0,04 0,03
nat.econ.prosp. (0-2) -0,06∗ 0,03 -0,09 0,06 -0,09 0,03
self-employed -0,16 0,08 -0,24 0,19 -0,13 0,09
manager -0,04 0,08 -0,14 0,16 -0,04 0,08
white-collar -0,08 0,07 -0,13 0,17 -0,09 0,08
manual -0,08 0,07 -0,17 0,17 -0,07 0,07
house work 0,01 0,03 0,04 0,05 0,01 0,03
retired -0,24∗∗ 0,08 -0,45∗ 0,20 -0,28∗ 0,08
student -0,20∗ 0,09 -0,20 0,19 -0,27 0,10
Identity
attach. to nation (1-4) -0,08 0,03 -0,07 0,06 -0,10 0,03
enlargement (0/1) -0,16∗∗∗ 0,04 -0,27∗ 0,08 -0,24∗ 0,04
Pol. Cues
polor (1-10) -0,03∗∗ 0,01 -0,06∗ 0,02 -0,03∗ 0,01
age 0,00∗ 0,00 0,01∗ 0,00 0,01∗ 0,04
gender (1=male) 0,03 0,04 -0,09 0,08 -0,02 0,01
Intercept 1 0,52 0,05 -0,12 0,16 -0,56 0,47 -0,58 0,17
Intercept 2 0,33 0,06 0,26 0,16 0,21 0,48 2,19 0,17
N 24748 15385 3706 13573
Log likelihood -17498,867 -10849,837 -2573,04 -10006,13
∗∗∗ significant at .001 level, ∗∗ significant at .01 level, ∗ significant at .05 level; SE: robust std. errors
country dummies not displayed; baseline model: UK, female, and unemployed respondents
The second weakness of my conceptualization of ambivalence is that it assigns respondents a
value of zero (no ambivalence) when they select the neutral category both in regard to whether
they support the EU membership of their country and when they are asked about the image
that the EU has for them. This combination of answers can mean indifference just as much
as it can stem from a truly ambivalent respondent who expresses his or her ambivalence in
this way. When psychologists use two scales to measure ambivalence, one going from zero to
approval and one going from zero to disapproval, they can easily distinguish between indifference
and ambivalence. A respondent who has low values on both scales is indifferent rather than
ambivalent, since her answers do not indicate the simultaneous presence of both approval and
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disapproval. In order to distinguish indifference from ambivalence among the respondents who
selected the middle category on both items, I use the following criteria: The Eurobarometer
survey asks respondents also if they ever heard of institutions such as the European Parliament
(EP), the European Council, or the European Commission. Additionally, it asks people if they
discuss politics with friends often, sometimes, or never. I argue that if respondents never discuss
politics and have never heard of the EP, the Council, or the Commission but still selected the
middle category in regard to whether they support the EU and what their image of the EU
is, they are indifferent rather than ambivalent. In order to feel ambivalent about something,
one needs to have considerations on the corresponding object in mind. If someone has never
heard of the most important institutions of the EU, it is unlikely that such considerations are
accessible. The remaining group that selected the middle category on both questions (around
three/quarters) is treated as (neither/nor-)ambivalence.
Since this group of neither/nor-ambivalent respondents can have biased the results as long
as it was grouped together with unambivalent respondents, I calculat the model again. In model
four, all respondents that expressed their ambivalence by answering the middle category on both
items (”neither-nor-ambivalent” respondents) are excluded. All those that have never heard of
the central EU institutions are left in the sample, as they can be seen as indifferent and therefore
also unambivalent. These changes do not affect the results. The coefficients for subjective and
objective knowledge, as well as the one for dual identity are still negative and significant.
Calculating a regression on a subset by simply excluding the ”neither/nor-ambivalent”-group
can also introduce bias. Grouping these respondents together with the medium or highly am-
bivalent respondents, or merging all three groups are options, but there is a better alternative.
The model can be calculated again with a multinomial logit regression. In this regression,
one does not rank the categories of the dependent variables and only specifies the different
categories in which respondents are grouped. In our case we have four categories: unambiva-
lent respondents, medium level ambivalence, highly ambivalent people, and the (new) group of
neither-nor-ambivalent respondents. The result tables of a multinomial regression are extensive
and not displayed.15 Holding everything else constant, more subjective knowledge, more ob-
jective knowledge, as well as a dual identity make higher level ambivalence less likely. Figure 4
makes the results of the multinomial regression accessible. It shows the predicted probability of
a respondent to be in each of the categories as subjective knowledge (x-axis) increases and when
everything else is held constant. The most apparent patterns are the upward slope of the line
of unambivalent respondents and the downward trend of the line for medium level ambivalence.
While the line for high ambivalence stays relatively stable, being in the category of neither/nor
15 The results can be obtained from the author.
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ambivalence also decreases when respondents have more knowledge on the EU. The probability
plot for different values of objective knowledge (figure 5) shows slopes that are less steep. In
contrast to subjective knowledge, more objective knowledge on the EU seems to decrease the
probability of respondents to be in the medium level ambivalence group – and the probability of
people being unambivalent increases. Figure 6 refers to the probabilities for being in each group
depending on whether a respondent has or has not a dual identity. A dual identity increases
the probability of being in the group of unambivalent respondents, while it decreases the prob-
abilities for being in each of the other categories, including medium and high level ambivalence,
as well as neither-nor-ambivalence. These results serve as further support for the initial finding
that knowledge and a dual identity decrease ambivalence in EU support.
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Fig. 4: Results of multinomial regression: predicted probability plot 1
Fig. 5: Results of multinomial regression: predicted probability plot 2
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Fig. 6: Results of multinomial regression: predicted probability plot 3
EU Support among Ambivalent and Unambivalent Citizens
Hypothesis three stated that a standard socioeconomic variables based model to explain
EU support performs much better among unambivalent respondents than among ambivalent
respondents. To test this hypothesis, I estimate three OLS regression models with (level of) EU
support as dependent variable.16 The models use country dummies (not displayed), as well as
predictors for cognitive mobilization (knowledge on the EU, opinion leadership, and education),
economic rationality (personal economic prospects, national economic prospects, and dummies
for occupation), identity (attachment to one’s country and attitude towards enlargement), po-
litical orientation, age and gender. The left column in table 4 shows a model based on a full
sample. The column in the middle refers to a model calculated only with respondents who are
unambivalent. The right column is based on a subset of the sample only with respondents who
are considered ambivalent17 .
The results of the full sample model confirm the literature on attitudes towards European
integration (Hooghe and Marks 2005). All variables capturing cognitive mobilization have a
positive and significant effect on EU support. A more positive personal and national economic
situation assessment increases individual level EU support. Being for EU enlargement increases
EU support. Attachment to the EU is a fairly strong predictor for EU support. A right of center
16 EU support is operationalized as a respondent’s mean of the two items “membership support” and “image
of the EU”.
17 Includes respondents in the categories “medium ambivalence”, “high ambivalence”, and ”neither-nor-
ambivalence”.
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political orientation also increases EU support significantly.
The differences in model fit of the three models reveal an intriguing pattern. The adjusted R-
square of the model calculated using the full sample is .23. The R-square for the model estimated
by using only unambivalent respondents is .28. In contrast, the model fit of the regression using
only ambivalent respondents is much lower with 0.09. This shows that a standard model pre-
dicting EU support performs much better when including only unambivalent respondents. The
same model can explain much less of the variance when respondents are ambivalent in regard
to their support for the EU. Put differently, a standard model for EU support explains much
more which factors drive attitudes towards European integration for people who are unambiva-
lent on this issue, than for people who are ambivalent. This connects to the heteroskedastic
regression approach to modeling ambivalence. In this tradition the authors argued that ambiva-
lence is revealed by response variation. This implied that any regression model performs worse
for ambivalent respondents and that their attitudes can be much less reliably predicted. This
convergence of the heteroskedastic regression approach and my one provides support for that
both approaches to ambivalence talk to one another.
The large gap in model fit between the low and high ambivalence samples confirms my third
hypothesis. It also emphasizes that the process through which unambivalent Europeans deter-
mine their stance on European integration is different for ambivalent respondents. My results
imply that we have a more limited understanding of which factors drive attitudes toward the EU
when people are ambivalent - and that ambivalent Europeans are different from their unambiva-
lent peers. One reason that such a standard model to explain EU support performs worse for
ambivalent respondents is that they might be much more affected by temporarily salient infor-
mation as suggested by the literature on ambivalence in American public opinion research (e.g.
Lavine et al. 1998). This analysis is weakened by the fact that the differentiation between am-
bivalent and unambivalent respondents uses the same two variables (“EU membership support”
and “image of the EU”) that also make up the dependent variable “level of EU support”. This
problem cannot be circumvented in the absence of a third variable that measures ambivalence
in EU support independently. The substantive significance of these preliminary results suggests
clear hypotheses for further research. Future research would need to test if standard socioeco-
nomic and identity based models explaining EU support pertain indeed more to unambivalent
respondents and if this can be explained with the fact that for ambivalent respondents, current
events and temporarily salient information are more important for their extent of support for
European integration than all other variables..
23
Table 4: EU support: unambivalent and ambivalent Europeans
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
full sample unambiv. subset ambiv. subset
Variable Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Cogn. Mobilization
subj. knowledge (0-1) 1,97∗∗∗ 0,11 2,40∗∗∗ 0,16 0,27∗ 0,12
obj. knowledge (0-1) 0,88∗∗∗ 0,09 1,21∗∗ 0,13 0,13 0,09
dual identity (0/1) 1,12∗∗∗ 0,05 0,91∗∗∗ 0,06 0,37∗∗∗ 0,08
opinion leadership (1-4) 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,03 0,00 0,02
education (0-11) 0,08∗∗∗ 0,01 0,08∗∗∗ 0,01 0,04∗∗∗ 0,01
Econ. Rational
pers. econ. prospects (0-2) 0,10∗∗∗ 0,03 0,10∗ 0,04 -0,02 0,04
country econ. prosp. (0-2) 0,19∗∗∗ 0,03 0,19∗∗∗ 0,04 0,02 0,03
self-employed 0,12 0,09 0,09 0,12 0,15 0,09
manager 0,18∗ 0,08 0,11 0,11 0,22∗ 0,08
white-collar 0,08 0,08 0,00 0,11 0,10 0,08
manual -0,01 0,07 -0,04 0,10 0,02 0,07
house work -0,05 0,03 -0,06 0,04 -0,04 0,03
retired 0,17∗ 0,08 0,12 0,12 0,07 0,08
student 0,47∗∗∗ 0,09 0,40∗∗∗ 0,12 0,40∗∗∗ 0,10
Identity
attach. to nation (1-4) 0,19∗∗∗ 0,03 0,20∗∗∗ 0,05 0,07∗ 0,03
enlargement (0/1) 1,16∗∗∗ 0,04 1,53∗∗∗ 0,06 0,43∗∗∗ 0,04
Pol. Cues
polor (1-10) 0,07∗∗∗ 0,01 0,07∗∗ 0,01 0,03∗∗∗ 0,01
age 0,00 0,00 -0,01∗ 0,00 0,00 0,00
gender (1=male) 0,02 0,04 -0,03 0,06 0,05 0,04
Constant 2,87 0,18 2,86 0,26 4,27 0,18
N 15316 8684 6632
Adjusted R-Square 0,23 0,28 0,09
∗∗∗ significant at .001 level, ∗∗ significant at .01 level, ∗ significant at .05 level,
country dummies not displayed; baseline model: UK, female, and unemployed respondents
SE: robust standard errors
Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to examine if there is ambivalence in EU citizen’s support for
European integration and whether knowledge on the EU makes people less or more ambivalent.
A growing body of literature in social psychology and American public opinion research finds
that ambivalence in political attitudes has a direct impact on political outcomes. Ambivalent
individuals have less stable and less predictable attitudes and are more susceptible to temporarily
salient cues. Thus, ambivalence can play an important role for European integration when
it comes to the cueing effect of anti-EU extremist parties, campaigns before referendums on
European integration, or salient EU level events such as the crisis of the Euro.
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EU public opinion survey research is not yet concerned with ambivalence, so that no question
item in current large-N surveys offers a direct measure of ambivalence. Therefore, ambivalence
was measured by the extent to which someone’s answers to two questions on the EU – support
for EU membership and image of the EU – differed from one another. Most people answered
these questions consistently, i.e. with low deviations from the mean across them. However, some
respondents’ answers deviated very much from their mean across the items. These answers were
considered ambivalent. I find that more self-assessed knowledge, more objective knowledge, and
a dual identity make people less ambivalent in their support for European integration.
My analysis also deals with the potential criticism that measures of ambivalence assess how
nuanced people’s attitudes are rather than measuring ambivalence per se. My results show that
knowledge decreases the score of the dependent variable for all respondents, including highly
educated respondents. If the measure was picking up nuanced attitudes rather than ambivalence,
this would suggest the unlikely result that highly educated people develop less nuanced attitudes
when they possess more knowledge on the EU. The analysis also focuses on the problem that
some respondents might express their ambivalence by selecting the middle category on both
question items with which ambivalence is measured. Even though these respondents do not
show response variation, they could indeed be ambivalent. I estimated a multinomial regression
in order to test if this concern biased the results. Respondents that selected the middle category
on both items were considered to be ambivalent in their own way, side by side with medium level
and high level ambivalent ones. As the results of the multinomial regression show, knowledge
and a dual identity make people less likely to be in any one of the ambivalent groups.
A common approach in the literature is to conceptualize ambivalence as response variation
(Alvarez and Brehm 1995, 1997, 2002). This involves estimating a heteroskedastic regression to
assess which predictors affect ambivalence understood as response variation. Among the lim-
itations of this procedure is that respondents are considered ambivalent just because they are
similar in many respects but differ much in their value of the dependent variable. Unambivalent
respondents would be those who are similar in many respects and in their value on the depen-
dent variable. In order to ascertain that my results are not driven by my operationalization
of ambivalence and to connect to this tradition in the literature, I estimated a heteroskedastic
regression first. The results contradict the findings of Steenbergen and De Vries (2011), but
confirm my claims: subjective and objective knowledge on the EU, as well as a dual identity
decrease ambivalence in EU support when conceptualized as response variation.
In the last section of this paper I show that a standard model explaining EU support performs
differently for non-ambivalent respondents and ambivalent ones. Using the same predictors, one
can explain three times as much of the variance in support for non-ambivalent respondents than
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for ambivalent respondents. This leads me to conclude that the process by which ambivalent
Europeans form their attitudes on European integration is different from that among their unam-
bivalent peers. The existing literature on EU support applies well to non-ambivalent Europeans
whereas our understanding of ambivalent Europeans is limited. A potential reason for this result
is that things not included in the model, like cues from current events, play a more important
role for ambivalent respondents than for unambivalent ones, and thus EU support among the
latter can be explained better than among the former. Due to a lack of a direct measure for
ambivalence which is unrelated to EU support, this results must be seen as a hypothesis for
future research.
Both approaches to measuring ambivalence – using response variation across two EU related
items and heteroskedastic regression analysis – are rather distant ways of capturing this concept.
Since there is evidence that some Europeans are ambivalent about European integration and that
they are indeed different from unambivalent Europeans, our understanding of EU support would
benefit tremendously from the inclusion of items gauging ambivalence more directly in standard
periodical large-N surveys such as the Eurobarometer or the European Election Study. In the
American election studies, respondents are for example asked to rate parties and candidates
on two separate scales, one being how favorable one’s attitudes are, the other one being how
unfavorable one’s attitudes are towards the same object. Applied to the European context,
such an approach would follow the suggestions by Kaplan (1972) and provide a direct measure
for ambivalence. This in turn would allow for a more detailed study of which cues ambivalent
Europeans use to form their attitude on European integration, under which circumstances EU
citizens are more or less ambivalent, and if their attitudes are - as the literature suggests - less
stable and more likely to be affected by temporarily salient cues. We would also be able to get
a better understanding of why we sometimes see sudden changes in public opinion on the EU,
successes of anti-EU campaigns or extremist parties in EP elections. Studying the consequences
of ambivalence in EU support should also be an avenue in experiment based political psychology
research for its strength in examining differences in people’s cue susceptibility.
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APPENDIX
Table 5: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
dependent variables
Ambivalence in EU support 0.17 0.268 0 1 25933
EU support 6.69 2.60 0 10 25515
independent variables
Cogn. Mobilization
education 4.301 3.356 0 11 29532
objective knowledge on EU 0.511 0.263 0 1 26768
subjective knowledge on EU 0.315 0.207 0 1 25412
opinion leadership 1.8 1.08 0 4 29914
Econ. Rational
national economic prospects 0.796 0.696 0 2 27006
personal economic prospects 0.634 0.727 0 2 26292
self-employed 0.076 0.265 0 1 30281
manager 0.099 0.298 0 1 30281
white-collar 0.102 0.303 0 1 30281
manual 0.206 0.404 0 1 30281
house 0.686 0.832 0 1 29423
unemployed 0.062 0.241 0 1 30281
retired 0.284 0.451 0 1 30281
student 0.078 0.269 0 1 30281
Identity
country attachment 3.494 0.674 1 4 29629
EU attchment 2.382 0.91 1 4 29201
enlargement 0.597 0.49 0 1 25978
dual identity .0956 .294 0 1 30281
Pol. Orientation
political left right o. 5.404 2.244 1 10 24230
Demographics
age 47.798 18.224 15 98 30281
gender 0.443 0.497 0 1 30281
additional information
EU membership support 2.462 0.706 1 3 25933
image of EU 3.412 0.939 1 5 29485
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Table 6: Question wordings
Variable Question Wording
EU Support Index of two equally weighted items
1)Generally speaking, do you think that [our countrys]
membership of the European Union is (a bad thing,
neither good nor bad, a good thing)?
2) Image of the EU (1= very negative, 5 =very positive) and
Ambivalence in EU support 0 = if both items (above) answered consistently
1 = if one item (above) answered in different direction than the other one
0.5 = if one item of the two items was answered with middle category
Independent Variables
Cogn. Mobilization
Objective EU knowledge 7 factual knowledge questions on the EU; all correct = highest score
rescaled to to 0-1 scale (number of EU member states,
number of EMU members, EP members election, EP creation,
EP enlargement approval, EP and the budget, EU presidency rotation)
Subjective EU knowledge subjective: (1) How would you asses your knowledge of the EP with
regards to its role within the EU (1-10), and
(2) to the MEPs (1-10) and
(3) How well respondents feel informed about the EP (1-4)
opinion leadership Index of 1) How often does respondent discuss
political matters 2) How often does respondent try to
persuade friends, relatives, or fellow workers.
Econ. Rational.
econ. prospects of country Index of two items measuring respondents
expectations (worse; same; better) concerning
1) economic situation in respondents country; and
2) employment situation in their country
personal econ. prospects Index of three items measuring expectations
(worse; same; better) concerning:
1) respondents future life;
2) financial situation; and
3) job situation
Identity
national attach. People may feel different degrees of attachment to
their town or village, to their region, to their country, or to
Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to
[our country]: very attached, fairly attached,
not very attached, not at all attached; rescaled: 4 highest attachment
EU attachment same question as above: ’attached you feel the EU’
dual identity respondents having a 4 on nationalal and EU attachment
rescaled: 4 highest attachment
attit. towards EU enlarg. If respondent is for or against EU enlargement.
Pol. Cues
political orientation Left-Right Self Placement
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Table 7: level of EU support: frequency distribution
value frequency percent
0 599 2,35
1,25 1328 5,21
2,5 1020 4,0
3,75 1411 5,53
5 5,53 18,19
6,25 1711 6,71
7,5 3702 14,51
8,75 9154 25,88
10 1944 7,62
total 25510 100,00
Table 8: Effect of a 2 sd change on predicted probabilities
variable unambivalent respond. medium ambivalence high ambivalence
2 sd change in subj. know. +6 −5 −0, 6
2 sd change obj. know. +4 −2 −0, 4
2 sd change dual id +12 −11 −1, 5
2 sd change refers to change from 1 sd below mean to 1 sd above mean,
figures show percentage point changes of the predicted probabilities
Fig. 7: Histogramm: objective knowledge
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Fig. 8: Histogramm: subjective knowledge
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